e have argued that concluding that posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is overdiagnosed is akin to devaluing a useful concept because of some occasional misuse. In response to Dr Merskey and Dr Piper, we take inspiration from a famous quote from Winnicott 1 and would like to emphasize that there is no such thing as a traumatic event.
Rather, people experience dangerous events that may turn out to be traumatic. More than 13 years ago, the DSM-IV 2 acknowledged this notion by moving from a so-called objective to a more subjective definition of trauma exposure. From then on, the sterile debate as to which event is worthy of appearing on the DSM's list of recognized traumatic stressors abated. This implied that a large array of previously nonqualifying events were now considered to have some traumatogenic potential, inasmuch as they involved a threat to one's life or to one's integrity and if they were experienced with intense fear, helplessness, or horror. It also meant that seemingly traumatic events were no longer automatically considered as such: not all New Yorkers who were in the city on the day of the 9/11 terrorist attacks are considered as having experienced a traumatic event. When Dr Merskey and Dr Piper argue that the concept of trauma has expanded to include too many kinds of (trivial) life events, they seem to forget the fact that trauma is no longer defined as an event. But most importantly, they fail to recognize that the net effect of this change in definition on reported rates of trauma exposure and on the rates of PTSD is negligible. 3 Of course, there is the issue of recovered childhood memories of abuse. 4 What a flamboyant and entertaining societal issue, certainly a lucrative one for some psychologists and lawyers! In reality, however, it is a marginal clinical phenomenon that involves a very small number of individuals with putative PTSD. The same applies to the issue of dissociative disorders.
Merskey and Piper argue that "An attractive diagnosis [such as PTSD] to cover symptoms that might not otherwise be respectable will be adopted [by the patient] more often than is appropriate." 5, p 500 Indeed, this is likely, especially if there is a form of compensation involved. However, this is not a new problem in psychiatry, or even for medicine. Merskey and Piper seem concerned that it is easy to feign PTSD-it was not more difficult to feign a traumatic neurosis in the "good old days" than it is to feign PTSD. It is also quite easy to feign schizophrenia 6 or back problems.
In arguing that PTSD is overloaded, Merskey and Piper point out that not all disorders developing in the aftermath of trauma exposure should be construed as PTSD and that many PTSD symptoms can occur in nontraumatic contexts. Again, this is old news for any scientist working in the field of trauma, and although most of the symptoms of PTSD are not unique to this disorder, the onset and cooccurrence of intrusive, avoidant, and hyperarousal symptoms in the aftermath of a traumatic exposure is unique. Nice try, but PTSD is not overloaded!
